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Arstila (2012) reviewed competing
hypotheses for the perception of slow
time. Perception of time is fundamen-
tal to human understanding, and the
neurophysiological mechanisms involved
are heavily studied (Eagleman, 2008;
Wittmann, 2011, 2013; Phillips, 2013).
Abnormal perceptions such as slow time
provide an analytical tool. Here I put for-
ward additional evidence from high-risk,
high-skill outdoor recreation.
Reported experiences of slow time
are commonly associated with acci-
dents which are sudden, unexpected,
and immediately life-threatening; and
they also involve a perception of greatly
increased speed and clarity of mental pro-
cesses (Arstila, 2012). Current hypotheses
(Stetson et al., 2007; Eagleman, 2008;
Arstila, 2012; Phillips, 2013) are that under
extreme stress, either (1) our senses record
data at higher density; (2) our brains sam-
ple more of these data; (3) our brains
process these sampled data faster; or (4)
our memories store data at higher density.
Arstila (2012) and Phillips (2013) dismiss
(1) and (4) using various lines of evidence.
They argue for (3) and possibly also (2).
Arstila (2012) hypothesizes a physiological
mechanism, very rapid activation of the
locus coeruleus-norepinephrine, LC-NE
(Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005). Phillips
(2013) suggests that our brains use the
rate of subconscious (“non-perceptual”)
mental processes as a clock. If this pro-
cessing accelerates, our time perception
changes.
Previous analyses rely ultimately on
two types of primary data, both subject
to shortcomings (Arstila, 2012; Phillips,
2013). The first, compiled by Noyes and
Kletti (1972) are second-hand reports from
people involved in accidents. The second,
exemplified by Stetson et al. (2007), use
experimental approaches such as free-fall
into a net. These may be frightening, but
are neither surprising nor life threaten-
ing. Many high-skill outdoor recreation
activities, in contrast, do involve imme-
diate threat of death. Examples include:
cliff take-offs in hang-gliders, kayaking
waterfalls or Class V rapids, and surf-
ing big hollow waves breaking on shallow
reefs. Here I draw on four decades’
ethnographic experience in these activi-
ties, including >30000 participant-hours
direct observation of practitioner behav-
ior and emotions, multiple face-to-face
and electronic communications with 20
highlyskilledexponents,and60autoethno-
graphic analyses of narrow-escape inci-
dents. These data were compiled during
researchonfear,thrill,andrushinriskrecre-
ation (Buckley, 2012). Autoethnographic
data are derived from direct observation,
and can be examined in greater depth
than alloethnographic reports (Anderson,
2006). Triangulation to accident litera-
ture is provided by autoethnographic data
from 3 car crashes, including injury and
momentary belief of death.
These data yield three findings. The first
is that individuals are capable of accelerated
physical action as well as accelerated men-
tal processing. This includes extremely fine
and fast physical adjustments to control
body and equipment very powerfully and
precisely, in response to equally fast and
detailed perceptions of one’s own body and
the surrounding environment (Buckley,
2012). This matches reports from climbers
in accidental falls (Noyes and Kletti, 1972;
Arstila, 2012), that individuals “acted with
lightning-quickness inaccordwithaccurate
judgment.”
The second finding is that slow-time
perception and action can be learned
unconsciously, through experience and
training. Skilled surfers can adjust their
boards and bodies in freefall takeoff on
large steep hollow waves at exactly the
angle to ride the wave as the lip bar-
rels over their head. Skilled kayakers can
adjust boat, body, and paddle so as to take
exactly the one survivable line through
rapids and over waterfalls. Less skilled
participants perceive only confusion, and
are likely to freeze, panic, or act in ways
which increase danger (Buckley, 2012). It
is also experience and training which allow
skilled exponents of many physical arts to
achieve feats which appear impossibly fast
and precise. There are many examples in
ball and boardsports, gymnastics, acrobat-
ics, dance, martial arts, archery, shooting,
swordsmanship, and in aircraft, car and
motorbike racing and stunt driving. The
third finding is that at least to some degree,
some trained individuals can actively turn
on slow-time perception and processing.
This is part of the process of “pumping
up” used by skilled athletes preparing for
a difficult performance.
This evidence supports the suggestion
by Arstila (2012) that humans possess a
specialized hormonal or neurophysiologi-
cal mechanism for high-speed cognition;
and that this is activated inadvertently by
real fear of imminent violent death in acci-
dents, emergencies, and certain extreme
sports; and may on some occasions be
activated intentionally by individuals who
have trained themselves to do so. This
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raises three questions. Firstly, why is this
mechanism only turned on occasionally?
Presumably, it has high metabolic costs
or side effects which reduce biological fit-
ness if it is activated continually. Secondly,
if some individuals have learned to acti-
vate slow-time perception, processing and
action, what is the mechanism? Thirdly,
some extreme-sports practitioners report
moments not of high-speed mental pro-
cessing, but of complete calm and mental
clarity at instants of highest danger. Such
moments, once experienced, are effectively
equivalent to self-perceived religious expe-
riences, and highly sought after. How are
these two diametrically opposed percep-
tions connected?
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